The Freeman is a magazine published by the Foundation for Economic Education, a non-profit organization founded by Leonard Read in 1946. I’ve attended lectures at the Foundation’s mansion in Irvington-on-Hudson, NY since 2002. Lately, however, I have been a little bit disappointed with some of the things I’ve been reading in the Freeman. I’m not sure if it’s just signs that I’m outgrowing FEE or if it’s something else. One of the recent articles that I happened to come across is an article by Gene Callahan in which he introduces us to Michael Oakeshott (Michael Oakeshott on Rationalism in Politics, Jan/Feb 2009), a philosopher who, I must confess, I had never heard of.
Apparently, Oakeshott’s best-recognized work is his essay “Rationalism in Politics” which Callahan feels is not “appreciated widely enough.” Callahan explains that according to Oakeshott’s views, the philosophy of “rationalism” ought not be used in politics. To him, the “primary feature of the rationalist approach is the belief that the essentials of any human practice can be conveyed adequately by means of a ‘guidebook’ comprising explicitly stated rules, formalized technical procedures, and general abstract principles.” Oakeshott instead believes, according to Callahan, that the “rationalist, in awarding theory primacy over practice, has gotten things exactly backwards: The theoretical understanding of some activity is always the child of practical know-how and never it’s parent.”
Now, by the time I reached that statement in the article, I was already pretty confused. But, I really could not imagine how anyone could believe that practice precedes theory. Honestly, that makes no sense at all to me. What exactly qualifies as a “theory” to Oakeshott? What qualifies as “practice”? To my mind, practice is defined by theory. After all, what exactly are you “practicing”? I can’t think of a single human endeavor that doesn’t require abstract thought on at least some level in advance. What could Oakeshott possibly mean?
I don’t like to think that people are purposefully obfuscating. I know it happens. But people also make honest mistakes. Therefore, I’ve made some effort to try to see how someone could think that practice precedes theory. Perhaps what Oakeshott means is that humans must have some sort of experience before they can develop a theory or be in a position to reason, i.e., no idea is truly a priori, that is without some reference to sensory experience. Still, to simply experience something is not the same as practicing something. If I burn my hand on a hot stove, I haven’t practiced anything yet. Almost immediately, however, I will develop a theory of hot stoves and I will begin practicing that, namely, I will use that theory to avoid burning myself again.
It occurred to me that some people might be confused by the fact that as children we are often taught things without knowing where they came from – hence we learn from practice – and only at some later date do we work backwards to reveal the theory behind our actions. It’s important to realize, however, that our practice ultimately develops from someone else’s theory. Sometimes, we ourselves have done the theorizing, we just don’t remember that we’ve done it. Thanks to our big brains, this sometimes happens faster than we can realize – for example, we often pick up concepts sub-consciously. Think of many of the words you use on a daily basis. You know what they mean, but could you define them? One of my favorites is the word “game”. Everyone knows what qualifies and what doesn’t, but a definition usually requires running through examples in order to pinpoint the essentials. In this case, it might seem like you are working backwards to discover the “theory” behind the word, but you already did the work, you just don’t remember doing it.
Another issue that might confuse people with regard to this idea is that evolution has endowed human beings with emotions which often seem to follow no theory. But in fact even emotions develop from a theory. They just eventually become so automated that we don’t remember how or why we have them. Emotions are in fact very raw versions of normative sciences. For example, vengeance is the emotional raw form of the normative science of law and compassion is a raw form of the normative science of ethics. Our understanding of these subjects occurs at such lightning speed that we don’t realize that the theory was ever there. But we ignore the fact that there is a theory at our own peril. Our so called “intuitive” theories – i.e., emotions, can sometimes be in contradiction with one another – if we don’t fix that we end up acting on our emotions to our own detriment.
It’s important to realize that theories exist on all levels of abstraction and like every other human endeavor, they are subject to human failings. What Oakeshott doesn’t realize is that his own position on practice preceding theory is in fact a theory. There is only one way a person gets away with not using a theory – and that brings me to Oakeshott’s view of practice.
Oakeshott asserts that “rationalists” believe that the “essentials of any human practice can be conveyed adequately by means of a ‘guidebook’ comprising explicitly stated rules, formalized technical procedures, and general abstract principles.” These don’t sound like very rational rationalists. They seem more like pragmatists to me. To my mind, a “guidebook” or list of explicit rules, or “formalized technical procedures” do not a theory make. These are, in fact, attempts to put a theory into practice. Theories, especially the normative kind (which is the kind that a political theory would be) are not really reducible to a list of rules because the context under which they are to be applied is constantly changing. We do it anyway, but only because there are many people who either can not or will not theorize and in order to help them practice the theory, we need rules. Hence, the normative science of law is put into practice as a list of legislated or concrete rules. The normative science of ethics is boiled down to ten commandments, and so on. But, do not mistake these “rules” for theory. They are practice pure and simple. And, as far as “abstract principles” go, these are but the starting point of a theory. In fact, there’s much more to it and that brings me to Oakeshott’s next issue.
According to Callahan, Oakeshott once criticized F.A. Hayek because he felt his ideas represented a “rationalist system” in their own right and, in Oakeshott’s words, “this is, perhaps, the main significance of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom – not the cogency of his doctrine, but the fact that it is a doctrine. A plan to resist all planning may be better than it’s opposite, but it belongs to the same style of politics.” In fact, as I understand it, Hayek points out that central planners lack information regarding “time and place.” Theories, being abstractions that are supposed to apply to all contexts, come necessarily with variables. A theory can be thought of as a kind of equation if you will, with variables (Hayek’s “time and place”) that need to be supplied in order for the equation to be useful at all. Hayek is essentially saying that central planners lack context and with that he hits the nail right on the head. This is exactly what they lack.
If central planners were indeed attempting to implement a “theory” they would quickly realize that they were lacking context. That this never occurs to them is a clue that they are NOT operating theoretically. Central planners are in fact hopelessly lost in practice, the very place Oakeshott thinks they ought to be!
That of course brings me to the REAL abstract principles that a free society is based upon. The theory upon which a free society is supposed to be based is known as “Natural Law.” You know, all those deducible principles like the one about men having property in themselves (a right to life) and all that logically follows from that? Central planners forget all that stuff, yet this is the theory upon which a proper government is based. It is also the theory that libertarian readers of the Freeman should recognize. Why then are they being asked to throw all that away and contemplate the pragmatism of Oakeshott? I think that’s a really good question.
24 Comments
Gene Callahan
16 Mar 2009 - 3:07 pm“I can’t think of a single human endeavor that doesn’t require abstract thought on at least some level in advance.”
In fact, what you suggest, far from ubiquitous, is impossible. Consider language: it is absurd to suppose that someone *first* had the abstract thought, ‘Hey, we should all communicate with something I’ll call language, and only then did s/he begin to speak. No, in fact, the abstract idea *language* only occurred to people after many thousands of years of speaking, and theories of language came even later. Likewise, people did not first get the idea of *tool-making* and only then begin to fiddle around with sticks and so forth.
Now, if all you mean is that people using a tool have some *idea* in mind, e.g., ‘I wanna get that termite and eat it’, or someone shouting has an idea in mind — ‘I want Orgh to come over here’ — well, that’s true, but those ideas are not *theories* in any ordinary sense of the term. (You might see the difference in Greek thought between ?????? and ????.)
And, by the way, Oakeshott was a philosophical idealist, not a pragmatist!
And central planners are of course trying to implement a theory — often, say, Marx’s, or something of the sort.
Hayek, in fact, grew to be a big fan of Oakeshott’s, as he began to realize the cogency of these ideas!
Chris
16 Mar 2009 - 4:10 pm“I really could not imagine how anyone could believe that practice precedes theory.”
‘Practice’ is inherently messy and open-ended. ‘Theory’, in contrast, seeks to find order in practice, abstracting from that messiness and open-endedness; in short, to be theoretical is to abstract, and to abstract is to take out. Thus, there simply can’t be an identity between theory and its object by definition.
“Emotions are in fact very raw versions of normative sciences. For example, vengeance is the emotional raw form of the normative science of law and compassion is a raw form of the normative science of ethics.”
So, a normative science of humour, on your view, will itself be a joke?
Lisa
16 Mar 2009 - 8:18 pmHi Gene,
Thank you so much for responding to my post. (I want to point out that although my post here is somewhat critical, I’m still a fan and your book Economics for Real People is still very much on my list of recommended titles for those new to the subject!)
What you say about language is a good point because the theory of “language” as a whole certainly could not have come about in that manner. I was thinking that on a smaller scale, someone had to have a goal and an idea about how to implement it. So perhaps that is where our disagreement lies. I do not know Ancient Greek, but I imagine that is what you are pointing out. So in fact there are two definitions for the idea “theory” – one at a lower level of abstraction and one at a higher one. “Practice” then according to your view would fall between them?
It seems to me, though, that Oakeshott is saying that NO theory ought to be used in politics. But, how does an idealist avoid theorizing? And what about Natural Law – a theory which also prohibits central planning?
Lisa
16 Mar 2009 - 8:23 pmHi Chris,
Thanks for taking the time to comment! It has been very quiet around here and I’m glad to have stirred up some emotion!
I think Gene explained it a bit better in his comment, because as I see it, concepts are themselves abstractions, at all levels.
The normative science in the case of humor would be aesthetics, no?
Gene Callahan
17 Mar 2009 - 8:21 am“But, how does an idealist avoid theorizing?”
The world is a world of ideas, but the ultimate reality is composed of concrete, particular ideas, while theories are mere abstractions from those concrete ideas.
This is why, to Oakeshott, not all concepts are abstractions, by the way.
Chris
17 Mar 2009 - 9:43 amHi Lisa –
‘as I see it, concepts are themselves abstractions, at all levels’
I’m not sure how this matters (indeed, Oakeshott himself claims this in his early book ‘Experience and its Modes’), since the distinction between an understanding and what it understands seems to me untouched. So, a theory of just government is not itself just government, just as a (second-order) theory of what it means to theorise ‘just government’ is not itself a (first-order) theory of what just government actually is, even if the theorist is a political leader reflecting on both his own experience of government (= the object of a theory of just government) and his own subsequent reflections about what government should be (= the object of a theory of what it means to theorise just government).
‘The normative science in the case of humor would be aesthetics, no?’
By which you mean, humour is a matter of taste, and the normative science of taste is aesthetics? In other words, the normative science of humour need not itself be a joke, since a person needs to work their way up to some fundamental category before they may identify what the normative science of such-and-so is? I’m still not sure how that gets you your claim for an identity between subject and object though. Perhaps, however, the idea is that any theory of aesthetics will itself have an aesthetic. That, though, is the case for *any* theory, just as any theory’s elucidation (and not just the elucidation of a theory of action) is itself an action, every theory (and not just a theory of technique) involves technique, and so on. Thus, while your desired conclusion may be reached, it’s only done so at the cost of making each normative science ‘identical’ with the subject-matter of every other normative science, which I don’t think is something you want (unless you’re a kind of ‘absolute idealist’ without realising it!). Maybe I’m still missing the point though…?
Lisa
17 Mar 2009 - 8:26 pmThere are concretes and there are ideas. Ideas are abstractions from concretes. Even a concept as simple as “table” is an abstraction. I will grant you that there are concepts which exist at higher levels of abstraction than others. “Justice” is certainly a higher level of abstraction than “table”, nevertheless both are abstractions.
I am still thinking about your example with language. Language as a whole seems really to be an experience because it is a group phenomenon. This experience is then described and a theory of it is developed in the same way that I developed my theory of the hot stove. I see it as just a different level of experience. Money would be a similar development, I think.
Lisa
17 Mar 2009 - 8:45 pmHi Chris,
I think you’re losing me a little bit here – “distinction between an understanding and what it understands”? It’s certainly true that not all “theories” are equally valid – they either correspond to reality or they don’t.
My point with regard to emotions and the normative sciences is something like this: We feel a need for vengeance when we are wronged… why? For the very same reason that we develop laws and punishments to go along with breaking them – because the act of punishing another person who has wronged us acts as a deterrent to others who might be tempted. We experience a feeling of compassion for others… why? For the very same reason that we develop a system of ethics – because other people are of enormous value to us in our lives. People are very often unaware of the reasons behind the emotions – instead they just experience the emotion as a short cut – but those reasons are still there.
As far as humor and aesthetics, I need to think on this a bit more. Aesthetics is a bit less clear in my mind than the other two.
Anthony Martino
18 Mar 2009 - 7:53 pmExperience precedes theory while practice is derived from theory. The only way to determine if a particular “practice” is good or bad is by argumentation upon a pre-existing theoretical basis. If no such basis exists I am not “practicing” anything only experiencing.
Throwing the decapitated bodies of sacrificial victims from temple walls is clearly bad practice. The reason I know this is because of a pre-existing theory.
The same logic applies to current economic legislation being passed in the Congress. I can only claim it to be bad practice if I am aware of an already existing economic theory.
The evolution of non a priori knowledge is:
experience -> theory -> practice + more experience -> wider theory.
To claim that practice precedes theory as a rule is equivalent to stating that one can never argue against any “practice”.
Gene Callahan
19 Mar 2009 - 12:10 am“There are concretes and there are ideas. Ideas are abstractions from concretes. ”
No, the world is a ‘single world of ideas’ in Chris’s phrase — it is ideas through and through. Yes, ‘a table’ is an abstraction, but the actual table in front of you is not — and it is an idea. (What’s it doing in your mind if it is not?)
Gene Callahan
19 Mar 2009 - 12:13 am“The only way to determine if a particular “practice” is good or bad is by argumentation upon a pre-existing theoretical basis. If no such basis exists I am not “practicing” anything only experiencing.”
Both of those statements are flat out wrong. The judgments of good and bad practice long precede theories of that practice. They are based on doxa, practical judgment, not on theoria. It is a bad mistake to confuse every thought with theoretical thought.
Gene Callahan
19 Mar 2009 - 12:19 am“distinction between an understanding and what it understands”
What Chris means here is that, say, a theory of nuclear radiation is not itself radioactive!
Lisa
19 Mar 2009 - 3:17 pmAnthony,
It’s interesting that you use that chain from experience to theory to practice. I had written something very similar to this in my notebook when I was brainstorming this article!
Lisa
19 Mar 2009 - 3:17 pm“No, the world is a ’single world of ideas’ in Chris’s phrase — it is ideas through and through. Yes, ‘a table’ is an abstraction, but the actual table in front of you is not — and it is an idea. (What’s it doing in your mind if it is not?)”
Are you trying to say that there is no objective reality?!? If that’s the case then I think we disagree on a much deeper level than I at first realized.
Anthony Martino
20 Mar 2009 - 9:54 am“Both of those statements are flat out wrong. The judgments of good and bad practice long precede theories of that practice.”
Of course judgements of good and bad practice long preceded modern theories. Such judgements were made using the context of an older theory or if the person was ignorant an ad-hoc theory that they created extemporaneously on their own.
Again, how else could any judgement be made without reference to some theory however small or trivial? Do not criminal trials need to create a theory around a case in order for a judgement to be rendered?
“They are based on doxa, practical judgment, not on theoria. It is a bad mistake to confuse every thought with theoretical thought.”
Judgements need to be differentiated from automated reactions based upon culture and tradition. Your use of the term “practical judgment” is equivocating those two terms.
You can insist on obliterating the subtlety of language by equivocating thought with tradition or mashing the words “practice” and “experience” together as Oakeshott demands. However, the end result is simply a loss — in this case the ability to objectively distinguish good from bad practice. Ungood.
Gene Callahan
20 Mar 2009 - 4:29 pmAnthony, you are confusing ‘ideas’ and ‘theories’ — they are not the same thing!
Lisa, the world is a world of objective ideas. ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is objective, although it is an idea.
Gene Callahan
20 Mar 2009 - 11:36 pm“Again, how else could any judgment be made without reference to some theory however small or trivial?”
Hmm, and this is curious — notice that on your view, to judge between theories, we need a theory of how to judge between theories. But there could be many theories of how to judge between theories — so we must need a theory of how to judge between theories of how to judge between theories. But there could be many theories of how to judge between theories of how to judge between theories — so we must need a theory of how to judge between theories of how to judge between theories of how to judge between theories.
It’s obvious that one can never escape from this regress — therefore, since we *do* make judgments, it is obvious that we *can* and *must* make judgments that do not rely on a theory.
If you follow the above proof carefully, Anthony, it really should be decisive on this point.
Anthony Martino
21 Mar 2009 - 12:06 pm“It’s obvious that one can never escape from this regress — therefore, since we *do* make judgments, it is obvious that we *can* and *must* make judgments that do not rely on a theory.”
I consider judgements or theorizing to be the same because I consider both induction (finding the axiom) and deduction (logic) to both be aspects of “theorizing”. For example when Newton wrote his Laws of Motion (the axioms) and his equations (the deductions) one would have a tough time convincing people that he was not “theorizing”.
If you what you had meant by “theory” in your regress argument was that judgements do not consist only of deduction I have no trouble with that.
“Hmm, and this is curious — notice that on your view, to judge between theories, we need a theory of how to judge between theories.”
Of course, how else do physicists consider the potential of a Unified Field Theory to be a more encompassing theory compared to the Newtonian model? Or Copernican system to be an innovation over Aristotle? Just because all theories are deduced from axioms does not mean they are all equal statistically. (inductive comparison)
Comparing Austrian economic theory to the so-called “theories” of Keynes, Marx, etc. The latter are more properly classified as “nonsense” because they are not even deducible from their own axioms. (deductive comparison).
Rodney Q. Dalyrimple
22 Mar 2009 - 9:52 pm“Of course, how else do physicists consider the potential of a Unified Field Theory to be a more encompassing theory compared to the Newtonian model?”
You seemed to have missed the bit about the infinite regress.
Lisa
24 Mar 2009 - 6:29 pmWell, I think Anthony did kind of answer this question, but it might not be so obvious to everybody how. It’s true that all reasoning has to start from an assumption. We experience something, make an assumption (induction) and demonstrate consequences (deduction) and then we use this to further our knowledge. This act of assuming and demonstrating is what we are talking about when we say “theory”. To my knowledge, as of yet, no philosopher has been able to “prove” anything other than in this way. If a person is unwilling to set a starting point, i.e., assume or accept an axiom, then there will be an “Infinite regress” – in the way that a child’s asking the question “why?” is endless. Since a theory ultimately seeks to answer this kind of question, it’s easy to imagine that it’s the same thing. It’s not though because a theory by definition must follow from assumptions and the acceptance of assumptions puts an end to the regress.
I must say on the topic of infinity in general that I have a lot of issues with it. I simply find the idea to be beyond my comprehension. Nevertheless, I have no choice but to accept some things axiomatically as being infinite – time and space for example – because if I didn’t I would wind up facing… well… an infinite regress! So, at least at this stage of our knowledge, infinity seems kind of unavoidable.
Pete Stark
26 Mar 2009 - 11:27 amAll – Michael Oakeshott’s understanding of “theory” is addressed in a short essay, “What is Political Theory”, appearing in his Selected Works, Vol I (ed. Luke O’sullivan).. It repays study and is currently available free online from the publisher, Imprint Academic.
Enjoy.
http://www.imprint.co.uk/idealists/what_is_political_theory.pdf